Archive for the 'Telecommunications' Category

Complexity of communications

Recently, I posted about probability theory, and mentioned its modern founder, Andrei Kolmogorov.  In addition to formalizing probability theory,  Kolmogorov also defined an influential approach to assessing the complexity of something.  

He reasoned that a more complex object should be harder to create or to re-create than a simpler object, and so you could “measure” the degree of complexity of an object by looking at the simplest computer program needed to generate it.  Thus, in the most famous example used by complexity scientists, the 1915 painting called “Black Square” of Kazimir Malevich, is allegedly very simple, since we could recreate it with a very simply computer program - Paint the colour black on every pixel until the surface is covered, say. 

But Kolmogorov’s approach ignores entirely the context of the actions needed to create the object.   Just because an action is simple or easily described, does not make it easy to do, or even easy to decide to do.   Art objects, like most human artefacts, are created with deliberate intent by specific creators, as anthropologist Alfred Gell argued in his theory of art.  To understand a work of art (or indeed any human artefact) we need to assess its effects on the audience in the light of its creator’s intented effects, which means we need to consider the intentions, explicit or implicit, of its creators.  To understand these intentions in turn requires us to consider the context of its creation, what a philosopher of language might call its felicity conditions

Malevich’s Black Sqare can’t be understood, in any sense, without understanding why no artist before him created such a painting.  There is no physical or technical reason that Rembrandt, say, or Turner, could not have painted a canvas consisting only of one colour, black.  But they did not, and could not have, and could not even have imagined doing so. (Perhaps only the 18th-century Welsh painter Thomas Jones could have imagined doing so, with his subtle paintings of near-monochrome Neapolitan walls.) It is not a coincidence that Malevich’s painting appeared in the historical moment when it did, and not anytime before nor anyplace else.   For instance, Malevich worked at a time when educated people were fascinated with notions of a fourth or even further dimensions, and Malevich himself actively tried to represent these other dimensions in his art.  To imagine that such a painting could be adequately described without reference to any art-historical background, or socio-political context, or the history of ideas is to confuse the syntax of the painting with its semantics and pragmatics.  We understand nothing about the painting if all we understand is that every pixel is colored black.

We have been here before.  The mathematical theory of communications of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver has been very influential in the design of the physical layers telecommunications and computer communications networks.   But this theory explicitly ignores the semantics — the meanings — of messages. (To be fair to Shannon and Weaver they do tell us explicitly early on that they will be ignoring the semantics of messages.)    Their theory is therefore of no use to anyone interested in communications at layers above the physical transmission of signals, that is, anyone interested in understanding or using communication to communicate with other people or machines.

References:

M. Dabrowski [1992]: “Malevich and Mondrian:  nonobjective form as the expression of the “absolute”. “ pp. 145-168, in: G. H. Roman and V. H. Marquardt (Editors): The Avant-Garde Frontier:  Russia Meets the West, 1910-1930. Gainesville, FL, USA: University Press of Florida.

Alfred Gell [1998]: Art and Agency:  An Anthropological Theory.  Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

L. D. Henderson [1983]: The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver [1963]: The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Chicago, IL, USA:  University of Illinois Press.

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Extreme teams

Eric Nehrlich, over at Unrepentant Generalist, has reminded me of the book “The Wisdom of Teams“, by Jon Katzenbach and Douglas Smith, which I first read when it appeared in the early 1990s.   At the time, several of us here were managing applications for major foreign telecommunications licences for our clients - the fifth P (”Permission”) in telecoms marketing. 

Before Governments around the world realized what enormous sums of money they could make from auctioning telecoms licences, they typically ran what was called a “beauty contest” to decide the winner.     In these contests, bidders needed to prepare an application document to persuade the Government that they (the bidder) were the best company to be awarded the licence.  What counted as compelling arguments differed from one country to another, and from one licence application to another.   The most common assessment criteria used by Governments were:  corporate reputation and size, technical preparedness and innovation, quality of business plans, market size and market growth, and the prospects for local employment and economic development.  

As I’m sure you see immediately, these criteria are multi-disciplinary.  Licence applications were (and still are, even when conducted as auctions) always a multi-disciplinary effort, with folks from marketing, finance, engineering, operations, legal and regulatory, folks from different consortium partners, and people from different nationalities, all assigned to the one project team.  In the largest application we managed, the team comprised an average of about 100 people at any one time (people came and went all the time), and it ran for some 8 months.   In that case, the Government tender documents required us to prepare about 7,000 original pages of text in response (including detailed business plans and blue-prints of each mobile base station), multiplied by some 20 copies.    You don’t win these licences handing in coffee-stained photocopies or roneoed sheets.  Each of the 20 volumes was printed on glossy paper, hard-bound, and the lot assembled in a carved tea chest.

Work on these team projects was extremely challenging, not least because of the stakes involved.  If you miss the application submission deadline even by 5 minutes, you were out of the running.    That would mean throwing away the $10-20 million you spent preparing the application and upsetting your consortium partners more than somewhat.   If you submit on time, and you win the licence, you might see your company’s share-market value rise by several hundred million dollars overnight, simply on the news that you had a won a major overseas mobile licence.  $300 million sharevalue gain less $20 million preparation costs leaves a lot of gain.   In one case, our client’s share-market value even rose dramatically on news that they had LOST the licence!  We never discovered if this was because the shareholders were pleased that the company (not previously in telecoms) had lost and was sticking to its knitting, or were pleased that the company had tried to move into a hi-tech arena.

With high stakes, an unmovable deadline, and with different disciplines and companies involved, tempers were often loose.   One of the major differences between our experiences and those described in the Katzenbach and Smith book is that we never got to choose the team members.  In almost all cases, Governments required consortia to comprise a mix of local and international companies, so each consortium partner would choose its own representatives in the team.  Sometimes, the people assigned knew about the telecoms business and had experience in doing licence applications; more frequently, they knew little and had no relevant experience.  In addition, within each consortium partner company, internally powerful people in the different disciplines would select which folks to send.   One could sometimes gauge the opinion of the senior managers of our chances by the calibre of the people they chose to allocate to the team. 

So — our teams comprised people having different languages, national cultures and corporate cultures, from different disciplines and having different skillsets and levels of ability, and sent to us sometimes for very different purposes. (Not everyone, even within the same company, wanted to win each licence application.)  Did I mention we normally had no line authority over anyone since they worked for different divisions of different companies?  Our task was to organize the planning work of these folks in a systematic and coherent way to produce a document that looked like it was written by a single mind, with a single, coherent narrative thread and compelling pitch to the Government evaluators.     

Let us see how these characteristics stack up against the guidelines of Katzenbach and Smith, which Eric summarized:

  • Small size  - Not usually the case.  Indeed, many of the major licence applications could not physically or skill-wise have been undertaken by just a small team.  These projects demanded very diverse skills, under impossibly-short deadlines.  The teams, therefore, had to be large.
  • Complementary skills - Lots of different skills were needed, as I mention above.  Not all of these are complementary, though.  I am not sure how much lawyers and engineers complement each other; more often, their different styles of thinking and communicating (words vs. diagrams, respectively) and their different objectives would have them in disagreement.
  • Common purpose - In public, everyone had the same goal — to win the licence.  In private, as in any human organization, team members and their employers may have had other goals.  I have seen cases where people want to lose, to prove a point to other partners, or because they do not feel their company would be able to deal with too many simultaneous wins.   I have seen other cases where people do not want to win (not the same as wanting to lose) — they may be participating in order to demonstrate, for example, that they know how to do these applications.
  • Performance goals - Fine in theory, but very hard in practice when the team leaders do not have line responsibility (even temporarily) over the team members.
  • Common approach - Almost never was this the case.  Each consortium partner, and sometimes each functional discipline within each consortium partner had their own approach.  There was rarely time or resources to develop something mutually acceptable.  In any case, outputs usually mattered more than approach.
  • Mutual accountability - Again, almost never the case, partly due to the diversity of real objectives of team members, divisions and partners.
  • Despite not matching these guidelines, some of the licence application teams were very successful, both in undertaking effective high-quality collaborative work and in winning licences.  I therefore came away from reading “The Wisdom of Teams” 15 years ago with the feeling that the authors had missed something essential about team projects because they had not described my experiences in licence applications.  (I even wrote to the authors at the time a long letter about my experiences, but they did not deign to reply.)   I still feel that the book misses much.




    The future is bright, the future is sepia!

    The results of a competition to produce vintage advertisement for modern products can be found here.   The best entry is an advertisement for Mr Nokia’s Patent Mobile Telephonic Communicator and Typographic Messenger with Box-Brownie J-PEG Maker and MP3 Gramophone, circa 1900, which plays on the slogan of British mobile operator, Orange, now part of France Telecom.




    Run-time marketing

    Although mobile communications (mocoms) began primarily as a service for business users and rich individuals, for over a decade mocoms have attracted a mass consumer audience.   Perhaps for this reason, it is often the case that mocoms marketing folk have cut their baby teeth in the fmcg sector — those consumer goods that move off the shelves so fast that only a short, unpronounceable acronym would keep up with them.    But there are many differences between telecommunications and other consumer products and services, and, despite having pre-cut teeth, these imports don’t always cut the mustard.

    We have long tried to identify these differences, and the key difference seems to be the time at which the product is created.     If you sell chocolate bars, you make them in a factory, deliver them to a store, and sell them to consumer.  The product is created before it leaves the factory door.   If you sell draught beer, the product is party created before it leaves the factory (that would be the “beer” part of “draught beer”), but also partly created at the time the service is purchased (the “draught” part).   So a publican who waters down the beer he or she sells will alter the quality experienced by the end-user.

    But telecoms services are not created beforehand, and they are not even created at the time of purchase; instead, they are created at the time of use.  Provision of a network and its level of quality are created and re-created each and every customer call, and not even just once per call, but repeatedly throughout a call.  As a cellular phone user moves around during a call, for instance, his or her call will be routed through different cells, and these may vary widely in quality of service — for example, due to the presence or absence of other, simultaneous users in each cell.   This is quality of service generated on-the-fly, at-runtime, to use some computer-speak.  And, as with all marketing, perceptions matter far more than reality:   if customers expect a network to be congested they may be more accepting of quality of service problems than if they’ve been led to think they will be the only users of it.  

    Lots of fmcg folks don’t see the difference with their prior world.  Marketing can’t simply order the folks in the factory to ensure good quality product, and then sit back, gin and tonics in hand, to commission a few TV spots.  Instead, Marketing has to ensure that customer expectations are set and re-set realistically to match the quality of service being generated by Engineering as the network operates.  For new networks, add, “and as the network rolls out”.    Marketing have to monitor customer expectations and perception of network quality and compare with actual network quality in real-time, and adjust campaign tactics as they do so.  Marketing, too, has to be generated, on-the-fly.  It’s a lot harder than selling candy.

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    Porous boundaries

    Over at This Blog Sits At, Grant McCracken has an interesting discussion about the new corporation.    One of the features he identified is porousness, the idea that boundaries between an organization and its environment are fuzzy and in flux.  This has long been the case in telecommunications services, whose very business is connecting people.  So it is perhaps not surprising that telcos have been porous places for some time.  

    For British Telecom (BT), Britain’s largest fixed network operator, Vodafone, Britain’s largest mobile operator, was both a major competitor (when BT owned mobile network Cellnet/ O2) and a major customer (because calls from Vodafone’s customers connected across BT’s network, for which access Vodafone paid BT).  At the same time, BT’s customers, both fixed and mobile, called Vodafone’s mobile customers, so BT was also a major customer of Vodafone.  This makes something of a mockery of traditional linear supply-chain analysis.  How do you manage a relationship with a company that is simultaneously a major competitor, a major supplier and a major customer?  With kid gloves and internal Chinese Walls, presumably.    You may even decide to leave one market, as BT did by demerging O2, in order to simplify the relationship.

    Because most telecommunications markets were once regulated monopolies, most still have a major incumbent (as BT is in Britain).   This fact often makes governments and telecoms regulators tip the scales in favour of new entrants, in order to redress the inherited monopoly.   A common procedure is to allow new entrants to co-locate their switching equipment right alongside that of the incumbent — even, in some cases, inside the same buildings.   How many companies, other than telcos, could tolerate competitors having dedicated space and equipment inside their own buildings?

    And it gets even more complex.  As I commented on Grant’s post,  major users of telecoms services, such as American Express, often want direct access to the switches of their telecommunications services supplier so as to facilitate rapid reconfiguration of their service profiles.  Large telcos, such as Verizon, will often allow such access to their major customers.  But then companies such as AmEx, not being phone companies, often do not have the skilled staff to execute such reconfigs. So, Verizon lends AmEx some personnel, and a Verizon employee is sent on longterm secondment to work for AmEx; he or she may be paid by AmEx and report to a boss at AmEx, while retaining a career and benefits at Verizon, and physically sitting still in a Verizon building. Where do his or her loyalties lie?  

    Porousness indeed.

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